I did not find any writings by him about General Hicks that would indicate his disapproval of this campaign. But I have no doubt that he knew full well that the army under his command was not fit for combat, and he did not wish to correct the government by abandoning this campaign so that it would not be said that he hesitated in carrying out a dangerous mission. And I say, commenting on this statement, without any intention to belittle General Hicks or tarnish the memory of this soldier who sacrificed his life on the battlefield and became among the departed, that this interpretation by Lord Cromer does not align with reality. To clarify this, I will mention to you how this campaign was formed and the events that followed it. When the campaign was formed in Egypt and sent to Sudan, its overall command was entrusted to Egyptian officers, Sulayman Fayazi Pasha, and it was appointed to Askari Pasha as chief of staff and second in command. This situation lasted until the army was victorious in the battle of Al-Murayyi' on April 29, 1883. Sir Francis Wingate Pasha wrote about it in his book (The Mahdia in Egypt and Sudan), page 75, the translation of which is: Victory cleansed the country of rebels between Khartoum and Sennar, and the tribes returned, subdued and pledged allegiance to the government. Hicks was then in a position to turn his attention to Kordofan, the source of the rebellion. However, before this, he had to overcome the obstacles that the senior officials in Khartoum were placing in his way after the immediate danger had passed. He rolled up his sleeves and fought these intrigues a long fight that lasted through May and July and did not exclude