during Friday prayers and other prayers.

The Sayyid's campaign to achieve a respectable position reached its turning point in the "Sword Incident" in 1919, when he attended the reception hosted by King George at Buckingham Palace for the Sudanese delegation that had come to London to congratulate the Allies on their victory in the Great War. At the reception, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman dramatically presented the King with what he claimed was the sword of his father, the Mahdi, as a token of loyalty and devotion. The King returned the sword to the Sayyid, "to carry on his behalf in defense of his throne and empire (8)." This incident undoubtedly gave a strong moral boost to the new Mahdism in general and its leader, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, in particular. It was a true recognition of the new Mahdism as an institution and doctrine, and of the Sayyid as its leader.

From 1919 onwards, visitors to Sayyid Abd al-Rahman at "Abba Island" increased from the people of the West, so much so that this "pilgrimage," as official documents described it, caught the government's attention. Starting in 1921, the Sayyid held an annual parade on the occasion of Ramadan. The parade held in May 1922 was attended by between five and fifteen thousand Ansar. The government was disturbed by the extent of this gathering and summoned Sayyid Abd al-Rahman to Khartoum, where he was ordered to disperse his followers immediately and warned against holding gatherings on the island. He did disperse the settlements of the people of the West on Abba Island, but he established other settlements in strategic locations on the west bank of the White Nile, following a policy of fait accompli. As for the other measures imposed by the government to limit the Sayyid's activities between 1922 and 1923, which included withdrawing all his representatives and stopping the collection of Zakat, they were not successful. This was, to a large extent, thanks to Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's flexibility and his superior ability to exploit circumstances by avoiding these measures or rendering them useless and ineffective (9).

The Sayyid was also fortunate at this critical juncture in his life, as the British once again needed his services in propaganda against Egyptian claims of sovereignty over Sudan. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman had become too powerful to be overlooked in any effort to counter this threat. He responded strongly, touring the Gezira twice, collecting petitions calling for support for the government in the face of Egyptian activities. This time, too, the motive for his action was not his loyalty to the British, but his complete commitment against Egyptian claims of sovereignty over Sudan and the facilities he expected, and indeed obtained, from the British.

In the context of his campaign to gain power and prestige, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman sought to win the sympathy and support of some British officials, most notably the Administrative Secretary, MacMichael.