He tried to convince me that the agreement did not change the status or administration of Sudan, nor did it deprive Sudanese people of their right to exercise their final self-determination when the time came. I told him: "Egyptian sovereignty contradicts our aspirations and hopes." I emphasized to him the Sudanese people's determination to resist it at any cost. I said: "I see no legal right for Egypt to sovereignty over Sudan unless it relies on the right of conquest, and this, in my opinion, is a mistaken belief. The United Nations Charter does not recognize the right of conquest but grants oppressed peoples the right to self-determination." I explained to him that the theory of the unity of the Nile Valley, which Egypt clings to, contradicts the right of the Sudanese people to self-determination. I reminded him that when the Egyptians claimed sovereignty over Sudan at the time of conquest, Britain did not recognize it for them. The 1899 agreement was devoid of any clause granting Egypt that sovereignty; it even omitted any reference to it. It omitted it, while fairness and justice would have dictated that it clarify that it was reserved for the Sudanese. I reminded him that when the Egyptian constitution was drafted in 1933, the Egyptians wanted to replace their king with a king of Egypt and Sudan, but the British government stood in their way and resisted their desire. I reminded him that Egypt returned to claiming sovereignty over Sudan in 1936 but found no response to this demand. Instead, the 1936 treaty confirmed that sovereignty was closed off and did not go beyond that.

Security and Stability I reminded him of all this and asked why Britain had returned to accept what it had rejected in the past. Why did it agree to establish Sudan under the Egyptian crown? I warned him of the consequences of this new British tendency and its impact on the security situation in Sudan. I even affirmed to him that the friendship that existed between Sudan and Britain would inevitably turn into enmity if Britain persisted in its stance. I explained to him that I could not assist them in maintaining security and stability in my country if they did not clarify the matter. I also explained to him that there was no enmity between us and Egypt, but rather I assured him that in the future, Sudan would cooperate with an independent Egypt in the best possible way and reach understandings that would best serve the interests of both peoples. It was his turn to speak, and he thanked me for what I had said. He assured me that his government and his people viewed the issue of Sudan with great consideration and attention. He spoke with appreciation and admiration of the efforts made by Sudan in World War II. Then he began to explain his government's policy towards Sudan, saying: British Policy "We have recognized Sudan's right to self-determination and agreed to the establishment of constitutional institutions within it.

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