Memorandum of the Conference The call for self-determination raised by "Al-Nil" was embraced by the Graduates' Conference and included in the dangerous, historic memorandum it presented to the Governor-General in 1942. The Conference was then a moral force, if not a numerical one. The government recognized its danger and tried to diminish its importance and belittle the advocates for it. The president of the Conference at that time was Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed, a man distinguished by his honesty and loyalty as much as by his self-control. Moreover, he was a person who did not respect political theatrics and narrow nationalistic fanaticism. Therefore, the memorandum he submitted expressed the voice of the new generation and was not an aberrant tune repeated by political opportunists. Despite this, the government ignored the memorandum, deliberately wounding the Conference's dignity. They thought that refraining from responding would lead to the Conference being despised and diminished. However, a sincere and devoted call will not die, no matter how much it is subjected to the oppression of oppressors and the terror of tyrants. My own experiences support this general principle.

Why was it rumored that I was seeking the monarchy?

I had believed since the beginning of this century that if our right to freedom and independence was not returned to us, we would take it by force. This remained my conviction before the establishment of the Umma Party and after its birth, despite the fluctuating political atmosphere and its contradictory maneuvers. Some thought that my adherence to independence and my steadfast insistence on supporting it were fueled by a personal interest I desired. These individuals thought that I would not have aspired to the independence movement if my aim was not to be king of Sudan. The political thieves managed to spread the rumor of my seeking the monarchy in Sudan and Egypt, and perhaps the rumor leaked to the Arab countries through Egypt. The repeated denial of this rumor did not put an end to it until reality proved it false with the Umma Party's declaration of a republic. Some British officials had a hand in spreading the rumor. They thought it was a double-edged sword, believing it would strengthen my resolve in Sudan and that it would erode trust and ignite discord between the Ansar and the Khatmiyya. However, these British officials could not spread the rumor beyond very narrow limits, as their work and commitment to neutrality kept them away from the public. But Egypt amplified this rumor and mobilized its state apparatus and press to promote it for two reasons: first, to use the rumor against me and to counter the Ansar, and second, to attack the independence movement and describe it as a movement of personal greed and gain. Supporters of Egypt in Sudan repeatedly echoed this detestable rumor. I recall that one Egyptian newspaper called for my trial because I had deviated from Egyptian loyalty. 61