"civilization" those events, despite the strained relationship with its editor, Ahmed Othman Al-Qadi. The success of that experiment in the three cities encouraged him, so he sent circulars to the notables of the provinces requesting their support for that movement, of which he became a patron. But Sayed's successes in the world of effendis were not comprehensive. The conservative and older elements still owed allegiance to the Egyptian Sayed, and although the latter was more benevolent than his rival, he did not challenge him at that time in the field of young intellectuals, and thus Sayed Abd al-Rahman reigned supreme in their arena. It appears that by the end of 1935, Sayed was the most popular Sudanese notable among the educated and intellectually restless youth for politics (26). However, while Sayed utilized the educated for his own purposes, some of them naturally benefited from it, as they intended to set aside that relationship and get rid of him when they felt strong enough. But the accord with the educated contributed to strengthening and highlighting Sayed, and their patronage of them encouraged them to express their rejection of the government more frankly. This happened specifically after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1936. In this regard, Amin Al-Tom once said, "Thank God for the 1936 Agreement, as it awakened us from a truly deep and long slumber." This sentence provides a correct and decisive analysis of the reaction of politically aware Sudanese to that agreement. In that agreement, the British allowed the delegations a degree of Egyptian influence in Sudan. More importantly, they agreed to postpone the issue of sovereignty over Sudan for another twenty years. This, at the very least, caused Sayed Abd al-Rahman to doubt the intentions of the British regarding sovereignty, especially when his visit to London in 1937 failed to obtain assurances from the British government that sovereignty would transfer to the Sudanese. Sayed's concern grew that the British might abandon their commitment to working for an independent Sudan soon, for their interests in Egypt, which they were abandoning. They truly became resigned to this matter in the 1940s, culminating in the signing of the Sidqi-Bevin Protocol in 1946, in which they acknowledged Egypt's sovereignty over Sudan, regardless of whether that sovereignty was nominal or actual, and acknowledged the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. This treaty disappointed the intellectuals, both supporters of Egypt and advocates for Sudanese independence for the Sudanese. They realized at that time that it was unreasonable and futile to rely on either party to the condominium to achieve their nation's aspirations. The only way to do so, they concluded, was to create a national entity that would speak for all Sudanese. On that basis, different trends, despite their political differences, competed in presenting their proposals.