Facsimile · p. 419
The minister, Nubar Pasha, was weary and bored, and he was unable to control the man or stop him. So he sent his letters to the leader of English policy, complaining about the man's actions and warning those in authority in the English Sultanate of the dire consequences, placing all blame on the man. The order came for his dismissal, so he was dismissed and left for his country in disguise. Among his legacies were the dismantling of all the offices of the "Shuhna" (customs/revenue collectors), reducing the responsibilities of some other offices, diminishing the authority of the members of the country's Shura Council, not binding the ruling body to their opinions, dispensing with a large number of officeholders, and closing the doors of livelihood to the mercenaries from the sons of the country.
At this time, Charles "Charlie" Saïd, the English governor of Eastern Sudan and the Red Sea coast, arrived in Cairo. He asked Minister Nubar Pasha and Sir Barbour to retain Eastern Sudan and not leave it to the rebels, saying that this should continue until General Wolseley's army could defeat the Mahdi's followers and liberate Khartoum and its inhabitants. He had received orders to cede some of it to the Mahdi's followers and some to the Negus of Abyssinia, including its possessions and livestock. He saw no alternative but to travel to Egypt and discuss the matter with the minister out of concern. The minister convened his council at Sir Barbour's residence, attended by Abdel Qader Pasha, Mustafa Fahmy Pasha, General Stephenson, commander of the English armies in Egypt, the Financial Advisor, and Charlie Saïd. They discussed the matter at length and drafted an agreement, which was then sent to the English Sultanate. The council adjourned that day. The minister also sent a message that day to General Wolseley, the commander of the campaign, asking him about any news his spies had brought from Khartoum and its inhabitants. However, he received only a few cryptic words, full of riddles and ambiguities, that did not satisfy his curiosity. Meanwhile, news was pouring in to some dignitaries in Cairo and Egypt about the growing estrangement and animosity between General Wolseley and the governor of Dongola, and Wolseley's complete disregard for the governor. They said this was because the governor refused to march with his troops at the forefront of the campaign to Berber. The newspaper editors reported Wolseley's determination to divert the campaign's route from the Nile to Suakin. The rumor was almost confirmed by the crossing of some transport ships and large barges through the Suez Canal to Suakin. The news that the Mahdi's followers and those who had joined them had fortified themselves at the Berber crossing was confirmed, and their vanguard was stationed in the regions of Meroë or areas preceding it. When Wolseley learned of this, he took precautions and ordered his army not to advance beyond El Dabba, where they remained on high alert, ready to repel the enemy. Kitchner sent some spies from El Dabba to Khartoum, hoping to gather some news, but they were unable to do so. The order came to Charlie Saïd, the governor of Eastern Sudan, to proceed to Suakin, evacuate the remaining garrison there, and leave the entire country to those who claimed it, including the Abyssinians and the followers of Osman Digna. He set off in haste, and his news was cut off for a considerable period.
Requests to the treasury continued, and expenses increased, making it difficult for those in authority to cover these costs.