And the ambitions of British policy.

See page 73.

Aswan or Tanta.

Above all, how could the 1899 agreement involve England with Egypt in sovereignty over Sudan? The dispatch of a few soldiers, not exceeding two thousand, nor the agreement of a small amount of money, justifies such a partnership. If voluntary aid grants a right in itself, then Egypt should have a right in Syria and Palestine because, thanks to Egypt's men, its railways, its ports, and its supply of the English army with everything, water, and all kinds of equipment, it was easy to conquer those lands. Egypt spent more than four million pounds, in addition to the difference in the prices of what the English army sent, so that this difference alone in cotton reached millions, not counting grains of all kinds and livestock, which decreased by a third during the war.

The Marshal, who praised the Egyptian assistance during the Palestine and Syrian campaign, acknowledged this. Lord Milner's report stated: "It is only just to mention the services rendered by the Egyptian Volunteer Corps, whose value was beyond estimation, and without which the conquest of Palestine would not have been possible."

Does Egypt not owe England a moral debt to help it regain Sudan? Was not the evacuation of Sudan a result of its pressure on Egypt? Was not England like a guardian over Egypt?

Sir Edward Grey told the English House of Commons on March 28, 1895, "England occupies a special position as guardian of Egypt's interests." He added, "Egypt was not only surrendered by us, but was also surrendered and firmly established by the French government."

The Nile is the tent rope between the two Egyptians, for there are considerations