There is a mention of reward and punishment, which is a fundamental principle: and there is no basis for establishing obligation in the first case and negating it in the second, because the basis of obligation is absolute divine will.

And Al-Qadi Al-Baqillani, as narrated by Al-Ghazali, was an example in this matter of the general approach adopted by the Ash'aris in affirming divine will, as he believed that "if God obligated us to something and did not threaten punishment for abandoning it, it would be obligatory. Obligation is due to His command, not to punishment." However, Al-Ghazali leans towards a different opinion and approaches the Mu'tazilah in his commentary on Al-Baqillani, saying: "This is debatable, because what is equal in its performance and abandonment for us has no meaning to be described as obligatory, as we do not conceive of obligation except by its performance being preferred over its abandonment, in addition to our interests. If preference is absent, then obligation has no meaning at all." This linking of obligation to reward and punishment contradicts his statement elsewhere that "God Almighty, when He tasks His servants and they obey Him, it is not obligatory for Him to reward them. Rather, if He wills, He rewards them, and if He wills, He punishes them." This is because the tasking is a disposition of His servants and His property. This statement implies the linking of obligation to absolute divine will. Perhaps Ibn Tumart took his opinion on this matter from his teacher Al-Ghazali and fell into a similar contradiction.

The ability of the obligated person. We have previously established that Ibn Tumart agrees with the Mu'tazilah in the view that God does not task a person except with what he can bear. Based on this principle, he established in this section the obligation of the fundamentals and the tasking with them on the ability and capacity of the obligated person to comply. If the ability is absent, then obligation and tasking fall away. He divided ability into two types: the ability to understand the address, and the ability to act.

The ability to understand: The ability to understand the address is not complete except by the realization of six matters: -a 1 See: Al-Mustasfa by Al-Ghazali: (153) Same page and number. (154) Al-Ghazali: Al-Iqtisad fi Al-I'tiqad: (155) See above, p. (156) 2335