The independence of the principality by ruling necessitates the ruling, because necessity is implied by the divine address (i.e., the origin), and the principality is not based on the origin by necessity, but rather it may be absent. So, if it is absent and the ruling was based on it for its necessity, it will be absent with it and will not be obligatory. The second: The origin is the basis of the ruling, and the principality is the object of the ruling, and this object is based on the origin. Thus, the principality and the ruling become equal in their reliance on the origin. This equality negates one being the origin of the other, because between originality and derivation there is a difference, not equality. Likewise, if the principality is the basis for the ruling, it becomes equal to the origin in originality, while there is a difference between them by virtue of the principality's reliance on the origin. This reasoning is supported by the fact that there is no absolute equality between origins. Likewise for branches, because one matter may be an origin for a branch. And at the same time, it is a branch of a higher origin than it. For this reason, it can be said that the principality can be an origin for the ruling, and at the same time it is a branch of the legal origin. Ibn Tumart was not the innovator of the saying about the principality as Goldziher claimed, but the scholars of usul spoke about it before him with different words that indicate the same meaning, but he is considered one of the first to elaborate on it, and clarify the relationship between it, the origin, and the ruling, focusing on the distinction between the origin and the principality, and the principality and the ruling. Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawi also spoke about it in his Usul, by translating "the condition of the ruling." He defined it as "the term in the law for what existence is related to, not obligation. So, from the aspect that obligation is not related to it [i.e., the obligation of rulings], it is a sign, and from the aspect that existence is related to it, it resembles causes, so it is called a condition." This definition applies to Ibn Tumart's definition. See: Goldziher, Muhammad ibn Tumart, pp. 46-47. Ibn Tumart, The Most Sought-After Thing, p. 26. Al-Bazdawi, Usul (in the margin of Kashf al-Asrar by Ala al-Din al-Bukhari), p. 173/4.