This statement confirms what the Mahdi had previously stated regarding the absolute divine will.

Al-Ghazali said: "If God Almighty commands His servants and they obey Him, He is not obligated to reward them. Rather, if He wills, He rewards them, and if He wills, He punishes them, and if He wills, He annihilates them and does not resurrect them. He does not care if He forgives all the infidels and punishes all the believers."

It is clear from the foregoing that the Mahdi's position on human action is not as clear as it could be. This is due to the lack of clarity in explaining the harmony between the inevitable divine decree, which encompasses all events including human actions, and the divine command which is based on human ability, one element of which is choice. What is the role of this human ability within the scope of that decree? And what is the justification for the divine command regarding God's reward and punishment, which are related to divine will rather than the servant's obedience or disobedience? This is what Ibn Tumart did not explain with precision and clarity. However, we do not consider the Mahdi a determinist, as some scholars have claimed. Rather, we consider him, as shown by his analysis of ability and divine command, to be among those who believe that human ability plays a role in choice within the scope of the comprehensive divine decree. However, he lacked a convincing link between these two aspects, just as those who held this view before him, such as the Ash'aris and Ibn Hazm, also lacked it.

Enjoining good and forbidding evil: Numerous verses and hadiths command Muslims to enjoin good and forbid evil. The Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, said that obedience is only rewarded and disobedience is only punished, and they applied this as a necessity. See their view in: Al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsa, p. 614 and onwards. See also the detailed discussion in: Al-Ghazali, Al-Iqtisad fi al-I'tiqad, p. 212.

We mention, for example, the individual who says: "The Mahdi believed in absolute divine predestination and fate according to the determinist school, denying free will. Thus, he was in conflict with rationalist schools of thought, and even with the Ash'ari school regarding acquisition and ability." See: Islamic Sects in North Africa, p. 212.