The Sidqi-Bevin Protocol Why did he object to placing Sudan under the Egyptian Crown?

I had been following the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to amend the 1936 treaty between Britain and Egypt with great interest and caution since the beginning of the negotiations in March 1946. I had always strongly objected to placing Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, as some elements in Sudan desired, because the Crown meant sovereignty.

Placing Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, because I knew with absolute certainty that Sudan's subordination to the Egyptian Crown meant that Sudanese would lose sovereignty over their country and be subjected to Egypt in an inescapable manner. I knew that our submission to the Egyptian Crown meant the annihilation of our identity, our nationality, our morals, our traditions, and everything dear we possessed and lived for. I knew that our submission to Egypt meant that our doors would be wide open to Egyptian propaganda, Egyptian influence, and the independence movement, and its spread. I felt pity for my people and my country from Egyptian influence, Egyptian sway, and Egyptian temptation, whose dawn was then appearing before us. For all these reasons, I followed the negotiations with interest and caution.

An Important Message: In October 1946, the negotiations moved from Cairo to London. The Egyptian team was headed by the Prime Minister of Egypt at that time, Ismail Sidqi Pasha, who was known for his intelligence, cunning, and loyalty to the Egyptian Crown. The British team was headed by Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. News of these negotiations reached us intermittently, fragmented, and incomplete. One day, a friend contacted me asking me to send someone to him to carry an important message. I sent my son, Al-Sadiq.

Al-Sadiq returned to the friend with a message from the man stating that he had received news from London indicating that the British and Egyptians had agreed that Egypt would have sovereignty over Sudan. The man said in his message that he believed the Governor-General of Sudan did not have the influence to object to this agreement, nor the power to resist it. He added that he could not see anyone more capable than me to thwart what they had agreed upon.