vitality in the region at the same time. In return, Britain actually agreed in the Sidqi--Beaverbrook Protocol of 1946 that Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan and the unity of the Nile Valley under -the Egyptian crown would be decided. In any case, the Sudanese government tried to convince London not to grant Egypt those -huge concessions, but it asked it not to interfere in what did not concern it, and to stop chasing -after "self-rule" as if it were something isolated from the rest of the world (24). The British -government seriously considered appointing a new Governor-General to complete its policy and implement it, and removing Governor-General -Gore-Booth from his post. Mr. Abd al-Rahman was certainly disappointed and frustrated by that stance, and since -then he sought to distance himself from the British, who in his view had become unreliable and untrustworthy. -This feeling was clearly reflected in the campaign organized by the Umma Party since the 1940s, -especially its extremist wing led by al-Nadil and al-Mahjoub, against British policy in -Sudan. Furthermore, the new Mahdists tried to improve their relations with Egypt, and indeed found, -in reality, an immediate response from the leaders of the Egyptian Revolution in 1952. Naguib and his colleagues decided -to abandon Egypt's traditional demand for absolute sovereignty over Sudan and accepted the Sudanese right -to self-rule and self-determination. Thus, the February 1953 agreement was concluded between Egypt and Britain, -which led to the fulfillment of Mr. Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi's wish for an independent Sudan in 1956.

Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim 18