And the ambitions of British policy.

**71** Egypt, in return for this, agreed to a sum of 13 million pounds, while the English force in Sudan was about a thousand men, and the expenses for them did not exceed two million pounds. Egypt bore very heavy financial expenses for the sake of Sudan, as the accounting records indicate. It bore these burdens despite the debts accumulated upon it and despite the severe need for funds to carry out public works, especially irrigation works, by which basin irrigation could be transformed into perennial irrigation. It would have been possible to reclaim two million feddans that are not currently cultivated with half the money spent.

The natural and reasonable conclusion from all of the foregoing is that Sudan must be considered an indivisible part of Egypt. Even the 1899 agreement itself does not contradict this. That agreement associates England with Egypt not in sovereignty over Sudan, but in administration. And if the English flag remained hoisted over Sudan alongside the Egyptian flag, this was due to the concern for overcoming obstacles that arise from the implementation of capitulations there, which hinder the progress of that country.

In fact, the 1899 agreement included the provision that "it has become necessary to choose a method of administration and enact laws for the aforementioned reconquered territories." It further stated, "And since it has appeared for many reasons that Halfa Wadi and Suakin could be administered better if they were annexed to the reconquered territories." Indeed, Halfa and Suakin were annexed to the reconquered territories so that all would be subject to the system of governance decided by the agreement.

These Halfa Wadi and Suakin were never evacuated by Egyptian troops. Their annexation to the reconquered territories proves that the agreement was only for administrative purposes and was not intended to remove Sudan from Egyptian sovereignty. In support of this interpretation of the 1899 agreement, we cite the ruling of Lord Cromer, who