This is illustrated by the relationship between the origin, the sign, and the ruling, which we will elaborate on later.

This solution is based on considering individual reports (akhbar al-ahad) as signs for rulings. Therefore, according to the definition of a sign, they are not an origin upon which rulings are founded, making them obligatory. Rather, they are indicators. When the accountable person verifies them, they become obligated to act accordingly. Just as when testimony is presented with its conditions, it becomes obligatory to act upon the ruling that depends on that testimony. It is a sign upon which the ruling takes place. To further clarify, if we assume an individual report that includes a command to perform an action, this report does not definitively establish the obligation of the action (which is the ruling). However, it is an indicator that obligates the accountable person to perform that action based on conjecture. For while conjecture is not valid for the origin of a ruling, it is valid for the implementation of the ruling.

However, if individual reports are merely signs upon which one must act, as decided by Al-Mahdi, and if the rulings contained within them are consequently made obligatory by considering these reports as signs, then what is the origin to which these rulings refer? And there is no branch without an origin, as we will explain later. Perhaps Ibn Tumart considered the origin of the rulings contained in individual reports to be the broader principles and rules to which they belong, some of which are based on transmitted texts. This is understood from his statement: "Auditory transmission is of two types: continuous and individual. What is continuous yields certain knowledge. What is individual yields action based on the established origin." However, even with this interpretation, there remains a problem in considering individual reports as signs. This problem lies in making an individual report a sign while it simultaneously contains the ruling that will be acted upon. The implementation of a ruling upon a sign presupposes that this ruling is known before the sign, not that it is contained within it. And knowledge of its general origin, to which it belongs, does not suffice for knowledge of its details, because the implementation of an action is based on details, not on a general command.

See the following: p. 314 (91) And see p. 54-55 (92) Ibn Tumart, The Most Sought-After: 26