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Man in the choice between actions, and it leads to man being the one who makes his actions.

As for the Ash'aris, they held that ability only exists with the action, meaning it does not exist except at the time of its occurrence. It is not related to opposites, but is purely for one action, not in the sense of being solely responsible for its creation, because its creator is God, but rather in the sense of being associated with it, as Ash'ari saw. Or in the sense of sharing in its creation in some way with divine power, as most of the Ash'aris after him saw, because they allowed the combination of two powers over one capable thing.

This is the reality of the "kasb" (acquisition) which they adopted as a doctrine in the actions of man.

As is evident from our previous discussion - as for al-Maturidi and Ibn Hazm, they made the first category of ability to exist before the action. They linked the existence of the second to the existence of the action. However, al-Maturidi was closer to the Mu'tazila in considering the effect of man's ability on his action, while Ibn Hazm was closer to the Ash'aris in considering man's action as created by God. And it is strange to make this a category of man's ability. But to alleviate this contradiction, he linked the possibility of action and therefore man's responsibility in it to the first category of ability, which is health and the absence of impediments.

In contrast to these different opinions, we find Ibn Tumart affirming ability for man, considering it a manifestation of perfection, and denying him compulsion and determinism, considering them manifestations of deficiency. This is consistent with his saying: "He is perfect with knowledge and ability, and deficient with ignorance and compulsion."

In analyzing the concept of ability, the Mahdi divides it into two categories: a category related to the [text is cut off here]

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