The Mahdi was apprehensive of the Mu'tazila's objection to this view, which states that God does not will sins. Because His justice necessitates that He does not punish a person for what He willed from them. He responded by saying that the concept of injustice and oppression in this view, when attributed to God (i.e., assuming the will of sins), is measured against the concept of injustice and oppression in humans, which is a flawed analogy he called the analogy of actions. This is because "the Creator, glory be to Him, is not characterized by injustice and oppression in His actions; rather, it is characterized by one whose affairs are restricted and for whom limits are set. Whoever transgresses them is called unjust and oppressive. The Creator, glory be to Him, has no ruler above Him, nor any commander or prohibitor other than Him. So, if He admitted all His servants to Paradise, it would be from His grace; and if He admitted them all to Hell, it would be from His justice. He does in His dominion what He wills, and judges among His creation as He pleases. None can repel His command, nor reverse His judgment." In this way, by combining the comprehensiveness of divine will with sins and evils, with the realization of justice and the absence of injustice and oppression, the absolute will of God is affirmed. Thus, what the Mu'tazila's view leads to, which is the obligation of certain things upon God, such as kindness, the best course of action, and rewarding the obedient, is negated. This implies a coercion of divine will. It is clear from this that the Mahdi, in affirming the attribute of will, his view perfectly aligns with the Ash'ari school of thought regarding other attributes. We have not found direct or indirect details from the Mahdi regarding the rest of the divine attributes.