242 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

Yarrow boats sent up and put together all ready to take advantage of the first rise of the Nile. A corps of friendly Kabbabish Arabs to be enrolled, and to aid our troops in scouting and doing work in the desert during the great heat of summer. Meanwhile, it was hoped that the strong force at Suakim would have time to inflict a crushing blow upon Osman Digma before the hot weather came on, and that friendly relations might be established with the Hadendowas. A light line of railway, even if only pushed half-way across the desert, would, it was contended, render the transit of a strong force across the route to Berber perfectly feasible in the autumn. Once the Nile had fairly risen, about the latter end of August, the whole of the troops might advance on Berber, up Nile and from Suakim, combine there, and advance on Khartum. The issue of the struggle could never be for a moment doubtful, but it would be sharp and fierce. It was rightly said that a soldier should have no politics; and this was especially the rule with the British army and soldier. He would fight, as he only can fight, and give his life without questioner murmur for his queen and country; but what he did hope and ask for was that all his efforts and sacrifices might not be made for an empty idea, and the fruits of his hard-won victory abandoned at once and handed over to whomsoever chose to avail himself of it.

This was the line of representation that was probably the most popular, but it may be said here that the conditions which prevented—or which were accepted as preventing—the government from carrying out the plan of campaign were afterwards endorsed, not only by the public, but by the ministry which came into power. If those conditions had arisen from a series of mistakes, and especially the initial mistake of the despatch of Gordon to Khartum, the results were eventually regarded as inevitable, and any attempt to do more for the honour or the interest of England, the protection of the khedive's authority, or the punishment of the rebels in the Soudan, was thought to be futile, or, at all events, unprofitable to any satisfactory end, even if large reinforcements could be sent to General Lord Wolseley to enable him to prosecute an autumn campaign.

What were the intentions of the Mahdi could not be discovered. He, like Osman Digma, took good care not to expose himself to danger, and there were repeated reports of disaffection among some of the chiefs, who had recently begun to find that he could not do quite as much as he had promised. In Kordofan especially there was opposition, for there a rival Mahdi had declared himself, one El Senoussi from Darfur, who denounced Mohammed Achmed as a false prophet who did not obey the laws of the Koran. It was rumoured, too, that Khalifa Abdullah, the Mahdi's principal chief, had seceded with many of the Baggaras, that the spoil from Khartum had been taken to Abbas Island, and that food was so scarce that the natives had been obliged to eat the pith of the palm-trees.