AN UNPLEASANT PROSPECT, 24 1 boundary originally settled before we had consented to interpose by sending Gordon to Khartum.

There were, of course, strong objections to the adoption of a course which appeared to be an acknowledgment of weakness and failure. What should we have accomplished after all the preparation, the expenditure of energy which had surmounted what seemed to be insuperable natural obstacles, battles in which our men had defeated their savage foes, the despatch of a small heroic army which, after having done so much, was to learn that its sacrifices, its determined and conspicuous valour, had been a mere empty display, and that it was to accept what looked like final defeat from an enemy who could not be reached, but whose power had been shown in the desert, at Metammeh, at Kirbekan, and on the Red Sea coast. The power was that of savage attacks and retreats which would wear out a disciplined host by the mere repetition of fights that were not actual engagements, but mere wild onslaughts, to be repelled, defeated, and repeated for days and weeks and months at every point to which we might advance with the intention of provoking the enemy to bring a force into the field and fight a decisive battle.

It is no part of the province of this narrative to discuss the question of the campaign, nor to say more than has been noted already in previous pages of the contentions that the expedition to the Soudan was, in the first instance, too small, too late, and too indefinitely authorized.

In March, 1885, the situation was doubtful, but there was at the same time a general feeling that the campaign would be resumed in the autumn, and that something would yet be done to "smash the Mahdi" and Osman Digma. For the British troops in the Soudan the prospect was not a very pleasant one for the next five or six months. A summer in the Soudan desert was more to be dreaded than all the Mahdi's forces in battle array. Of course, it must and could be done. British troops faced the fierce heat of the Indian plains during the Mutiny, and they could do so in the Soudan; but the lon weary months of inactivity in mud huts under the sweltering heat of the desert were enough to dismay any but the stoutest hearts.

Those who believed that the expedition should not be abandoned because of the fall of Khartum and the death of General Gordon, argued that the probable plan of campaign would be to establish fortified camps along the Nile banks from Merawi to Abu Fatmeh or Dongola. Mud huts to be built and the healthiest spots chosen for the camp. The positions whence the caravan routes terminate at the river to be held in force, and every eft'ort made to have everything in readiness for an advance in the autumn. The railway from Wady Haifa to be pushed on as far as possible, probably to Absarat, so as to pass the worst part of the cataracts of the formidable " Belly of Stone." Stores, provisions, munitions, and men to be pushed as far up and as quickly as possible, and several more of the useful Vol. IV. 69