THE TERMS OF THE CAPITULATION. 393 Several regiments of infantry volunteers had arrived, the first availablebeing the oth Massachusetts, 34th Michigan, 8th Ohio, ist Illinois, and ist District of Columbia, this last being a Wa-hingtonregiment.

While thusstrengthening Shaffer's hands for the attack on Santiago, and at the same time There wasno food, and this was why no attempt was made to break out to the northwards and reach Holguin or Bayamo.

By the terms agreed upon, the garrison of Santiago was to march out and lay down its arms. But Toral surrendered not only the city but the districtdepending upon it, including all making preliminary arrangements with Admiral Sampson for a landattack on the Socapa batter}-, which would open the way for him to enter the bay and compel the surrender of thecity,General Miles recognised that it would not be good poiicv to drive the Spaniards to extremities. A prolongation of the siege might mean a disastrous loss of life by exposure and sickness, and the utter ruin of the few regular regiments which had done all the hard fighting, and which must be the vanguard of a force sent against Havana if the war continued. After a council of war and a reference to Washington, another message was sent in to General Toral offering that if he would surrender, hi- troops should be sent back to Spain.

This afforded a basis for discussion, and a conference was arrangedtor the afternoon, when Generals Miles, Shaffer, Wheeler, the country east of a hue drawn from Aserraderos to Sagua de Tanamo, including the garrisons of Guantanamo andBaracoa and all other posts in the regionthus defined. Why the surrender was thus extendedis not clear. It looks as if the Spanish leaders were becoming tired of the war,and had given up the idea ol a light to the death.

Theonefavourable ci mdition conceded to the Spaniards was that the troops were to be conveyed to Spain at the cost of the United States ible. This concession was not,however,such a pieceofgenerosity as it seems at first sight. Ifthegarrisonhad not thus been sent to Europe, either a large t< -rv " ■ must have been kept to guard them, and this under unhealthy condition-- in Eastern Cuba, or they must have been ferred to theUnited States at the risk of spreading yellow fever in the country, GENERAL I.INARE and Toral met under the shadow of a spreading ■n theneutral ground between the lines. At that meetingthe capitulation waspractically agreed upon. Certain details led to debateson the following days, and there was a difficulty in obtaining the assent of the Havana and Madrid governments. Toral told Consul Ramsden on the i:th— the eve of surrender— that if the permission did not come soon he wouldsign the capitulation without it and risk a court-martial. He had held a council of war, and it had been decided that further resistance was impossible.

On Saturday, the 16th, the capitulation was signed. The news wasreceived in the American trenches withcheer upon cheer and the singing of patriotic songs. It was just eight weeksand since Cervera'sfleet hadrun in between the headland-, bringing the storm of war upon ild city and 'its land-locked bay. Consul len, who had closely watched events from the fust, and was now dying of an illness contracted at LI Caney, thus summed up his impression of the siege on the day ol surrender :—