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Mussolini's attempts to gain influence in the Horn of Africa were met with resistance from Britain and France, who were unwilling to relinquish their colonial interests in Somalia, Djibouti, and economic assets like the Bank of Abyssinia and the Djibouti railway. Despite these pressures and Italian negotiations, Britain and France remained hesitant to compromise their positions.

In a renewed effort, Mussolini sought to win Ethiopia's favor, supporting its bid for League of Nations membership in 1924, despite British reservations. He also attempted to forge an Anglo-Italian agreement concerning Ethiopia, but this was ultimately rejected by both Ethiopia and France. This served as a warning to Ethiopia, highlighting the unreliability of the League of Nations, especially given that two of its members were acting so brazenly.

In 1928, Mussolini pursued a separate agreement with Ethiopia, a pact of peace and friendship intended to last twenty years. However, it failed to endure for more than eight years, as it was perceived as offering false hope of security to the Ethiopians.

Concurrently, Italy pursued a different strategy along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, aiming to sow discord and animosity between the Amhara and Tigray peoples, while cultivating loyalty among regional leaders in Tigray, which bordered Eritrea. Italian consulates in northern cities like Adwa, Gondar, Dabra Marcos, Dessie, and Adigrat served as instruments for this policy.

Post-World War II confessions from Marshal Emilio De Bono revealed Mussolini's decision to invade Ethiopia in the summer of 1933, with a deadline set for 1935. The rise of the Nazis in Berlin at that time forced Mussolini to reconsider his plans, and he ultimately retreated from his initial aggressive stance.

The defeat at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, coupled with internal challenges and the perceived failure of Fascism domestically, made the invasion of Ethiopia a crucial objective for Mussolini. It was seen not only as an economic necessity but also as a diversionary tactic and a means of collective catharsis.

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