British Political Ambitions 55 After the Two Agreements After the French withdrawal from Kordofan and before the January 1899 agreement between Egypt and England, and the March 21, 1899 agreement between England and France, the English pondered. The field was clear for them, so they asked themselves: what policy should they follow? Should they annex Sudan to their possessions? If they did, they would find no resistance after angering Europe and the indolence of Turkey. They said: if England annexes Sudan to its possessions, Sudan would be like a boat with a thread attached to every living soul in Egypt, and a single cut of light scissors on that thread would sever it, and a blow of a pickaxe in the Nile's course would divert its water or some of that water away from Egypt. And the proponents of this view said that if England annexes Sudan to its possessions, it would not gain anything new, but rather it would turn the temporary into permanent. Then it would extend to Uganda, encompassing Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal, and Khartoum? Then it would station its troops in Suakin, Gallabat, and Berber??

However, other people objected to the annexation, and the government began to weigh the benefits and losses. It did not occur to them to look at the issue from a legal perspective, nor at the deadlines for withdrawal, nor at anything similar. Rather, they looked at the benefit. Lord Cromer ultimately had the final say, and the January 19, 1899 agreement was concluded with its text and his opinions. Here is a summary of what he said about it in his report for 1899, which was the basis of their policy thereafter: "Sudan is a chasm that swallows millions, like snow melting in the sun. It is the cause of the weakness and frailty of Egyptian finance. England has agreed to large sums, hoping to recover them when settling accounts. On August 4, 1884, the House of Commons decided to open a credit of £300,000 for the Gordon relief expedition. This meager credit..."