Facsimile · p. 256
It is clear that all countries, except those exempted, have progressed – before the formation of three circuits, each of five judges, and that some are not satisfied with the middle proposal. Therefore, the government sees itself compelled to insist on its first proposal, as it is superior in all respects. In reality, there is no doubt that it is a proposal of great benefit to litigants and conducive to the improvement of the situation in the Mixed Courts at present. It has been requested to be implemented in Egypt for thirty years (since 1878) and is in effect in most European countries, especially in France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, where the primary circuit is composed of three judges and the appellate circuit of five. It is impossible, with the number of members of the circuit in Egypt being eight, for the number of cases pleaded before it to occupy each judge sufficiently. However, if the sixteen counselors are distributed among three circuits, with five in each (and one judge at the disposal of the court to be utilized in emergencies), pleading in a larger number of cases will be facilitated, as the number of sessions will be three per week instead of two, thus necessarily increasing the number of cases resolved weekly. The objection raised against this proposal is that the appellate judges are currently burdened with significant work and will not be able to resolve more than that in any case. This objection is rejected because the work of the counselors is not as much as is apparent from the statistics. Even if we assume that some counselors have a lot of work, there are also those who have long agreed with us, almost as a matter of course. The deliberation of eight judges is a lengthy process and a waste of much of the judges' time. Reducing the number of judges in the primary circuit to three is also problematic, in addition to limiting responsibility to a small number of judges – whereas it is now widely distributed – and thus the efficiency of the judges' work will necessarily be affected. However, if the number of judges in the primary court were reduced, as all countries have agreed, its advantages would soon become apparent, which would lead the opponents of the reduction in the appellate court to withdraw their opposition. But the opponents in this latter aspect believe from the outset that the project should be considered indivisible and that it should not be implemented in the primary courts before an agreement is reached regarding the appellate court. What we hope for is that the opposing countries will be asked to reconsider their objections to a proposal that has been accepted by a great majority of the important countries. It is regrettable that the government faces obstacles in its path to reform that are not based on solid ground, at a time when the conviction of the necessity of introducing important reforms to the system of the Mixed Courts is widespread.