This leads to one being ancient and the other being new. And it cannot be, for example, to it because this example is either connected to it or separate from it, or one of them resides in the other. And it is false that it is connected to it or separate from it, because connection and separation are attributes of bodies, and bodies are new. And it is false that one of them resides in the other, because neither of them is more deserving than the other, except by a specific qualifier that qualifies it. Then that qualifier is either without an example or with one. If it has an example, then the statement about it is like the statement about the first, and the statement continues infinitely, which is false.

If it is said: one of them is an attribute and the other is qualified. We say: this is false. Because it is not devoid of either each of them being an attribute of the other, or one of them being an attribute. And it is false that each of them is an attribute of the other, because of what it leads to in terms of contradiction. And because it leads to the condition being conditioned and the conditioned being a condition. And it is false that one is an attribute and the other is qualified. Because neither of them is more deserving than the other, except by a specific qualifier that qualifies it. And the statement continues. And everything that leads to infinite regress is false.

This argument was clear in its presentation and precise in its structure, which gave it strength and solidity. We have not found it in this format among the theologians, except for an argument similar to it presented by Al-Ghazali in "Al-Iqtisad fi al-I'tiqad". Where he based it on the idea of negating the opposite and the like, with a detail in the like until it encompassed the concept of difference that Al-Mahdi pointed to. And with the participation in the general idea between the two arguments, they differed in the method of presentation, showing the superiority of Al-Mahdi's presentation in precision and sequence.

Thirdly, the argument of negating otherness: This argument resembles the previous argument in idea but differs in its details. It is mentioned in "Risala fi anna al-Shari'a la" (See the explanation of "A'azz ma Yutlab" by an unknown author) (74) (See: Al-Ghazali, (75) "Al-Iqtisad fi al-I'tiqad", p. 115) The similarity between them lies in enumerating the forms that the assumed partner could take, then invalidating them one by one, so the assumption is invalidated. 209