The British Campaign in the Soudan. 191 professional subjects he naturally thought he could safely rely. He must have been himself deceived as to “the true facts ” when he spoke of “Gen. Gordon’s security” ; and his statement that “Gordon had orders to resort to military force if peaceful measures should not prove suecessful” seems absolutely absurd in view of the fact that he had been sent without a single soldier, that all the force available for active operations had been destroyed with Hicks-Pasha, and that Gordon had no force whatever except the garrison of Khartoum, already insufficient for its defence, as well as unreliable and wavering in its loyalty. Furthermore, if, as Mr. Gladstone said, “the Mahdi was waging a war for freedom,” which England should not put down, what was his heutenant, Osman-Digma, fighting for that he should be crushed? If the Mahdi’s forces ought not to be opposed on the White Nile, why should Graham have been sent to slaughter them on the Red Sea ?

By this time public sentiment had become too powerful and excited to be satisfied by such subterfuges, and it compelled the Ministry to organize an expedition for Gordon’s relief. Its purpose was emphatically declared to be, “ Rescue and retire.” . This tardy determination having been reached, the first step was evidently the selection of the best line of operations, and this selection must be the result of a thorough study of the country, all the more necessary because war in the Soudan has to be carried on under circumstances so essentially different from those prevailing in other lands, and which are these : I. Outside of the very narrow valley of the Nile the country furnishes absolutely nothing for the support of