164 The British Campaign in the Soudan.

But this was only another instance of the policy of half measures. The intention of the British authorities at Cairo was, if the expedition was successful, to claim credit for having permitted it; if otherwise, for having advised against it; and in any case to shut the mouth of those who pretended that the Khedive did not possess absolute freedom of action. Yet while permitting it, every thing was refused that might insure success. “ We absolutely refused,” adds Prof. Dicey, “to allow either English or Indian troops to be sent. We also insisted that the native Egyptian army which had been organized under British officers, should not be sent to the Soudan, because as these officers still retained their rank in the British army, their participation in a Soudan campaign might be deemed inconsistent with the theory that our intervention in Egypt was only of a temporary and provisional character. ‘Though we enforced, both by precept and example, the necessity of placing their troops under British officers, we allowed them to enter upon a momentous campaign while refusing the Egyptian government a permission to enlist the services for the Soudan of any officer either on active duty or on half pay.” Sir Samuel Baker’s arraignment of this shuffling policy is still more severe (see his letter to “The Times,” dated Cairo, April 5, 1884).

Hicks-Pasha organized an army of eleven thousand men. On his staff were eleven Englishmen who like himself had severed all connection with the British service, as well as some officers of other European nationalities. Although he had six thousand camels, mules, and horses, so many’were needed for supplies, baggage, and ammunition, that he was unable to carry more than