The British Campaign in the Soudan. 35 a hot climate ; the Suakim-Berber route was open, for the Bedouins of that desert were still loyal and the season was favorable. An expedition sent at this juncture would at least have saved Khartoum and the Eastern Soudan, as well as the lives and the millions wasted later in disastrous failure.

Not only was England’s aid refused to the ally whose army she had destroyed and whose government she had disorganized under the guise of friendship, but the Khedive was forbidden to use his own still considerable resources. He realized that unless he sent an army to suppress the Mahdi’s rebellion, the vast empire of the Soudan would be lost to Egypt. He directed Genl. Charles P. Stone (formerly U. 8. A.), Chief-of-Staff of what had been the Egyptian army, to prepare plans and estimates for a campaign. Although this skilful and experienced officer had never in person visited Upper Egypt or the Soudan, he had studied the reports of the expeditions which he had sent under American officers to explore those regions, as well as those of Sir Samuel Baker and General Gordon. He knew the geography and - topography of that country, and understood the peculiar difficulties of warfare in the deserts. He was an excellent organizer and a judicious officer, by no: means given to prodigality in public expenditures. After mature consideration, he estimated that a force of twenty-seven thousand regular Egyptian soldiers was necessary to reconquer Kordofan, suppress the rebellion, and reinforce the garrisons so as to insure future tranquillity. When it is remembered that Wolseley took over ten thousand British troops south of the 2d Cataract merely for the purpose of relieving Gordon and returning, without any