THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION. 407 the British Government had a policy. The policy may not have been a wise one. From my own point of view, it was eminently unwise. Still, a bad policy is better than no policy at all. Within a short time of his accession to office, Lord Salisbury, with the approval of his colleagues, resolved to make a definite effort to bring about the withdrawal of the army of occupation. The arguments in favour of such a course were numerous and powerful. We had made such a mess of our intervention in Egypt ; we had entered into such a number of conflicting engagements ; we had so committed ourselves by uncalled-for protestations ; we had done so little good, as it seemed, to Egypt ; and we had let slip so many opportunities of consolidating our hold on the country, that we had got entangled in a Gordian knot, which could only be unravelled by cutting its meshes. Such, at any rate, was the impression of the British public, and this impression, I have every reason to believe, was shared by the great majority of our leading statesmen on the Conservative side, no less than on the Liberal. At that time nobody out of Egypt, and very few people there, believed in the possibility of forming a really efficient native army in Egypt, even under the command of British officers.

Unless, therefore, the British army was to remain permanently, it was necessary to provide some sort of military force which could secure the continuance of order after our own troops had been withdrawn.

A French occupation was incompatible with British interests in the East. An International occupation was