THE NORTHBROOK MISSION. 393 paid so dearly. But in Egypt itself, the impression produced by our campaigns was of a very different character. We had insisted upon Egypt abandoning the Soudan on the ground of expense. We had thereby given an immense impetus to the Mahdi insurrection. We had sent out Gordon to secure the release of the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons, a matter which we could probably have effected easily if we had not compelled the Egyptian Government to consent to evacuation before the Mahdi had agreed to release the Egyptian garrisons. We had sent an expedition, at enormous cost, to rescue Gordon, after the failure of his mission, and then, when our troops had got within sight of Khartoum, we had suddenly turned tail, without making the slightest effort to re-establish order in the Soudan, or even to protect the tribes which had remained loyal to Egypt, and which had assisted our advance. After our retreat, we had taken no steps whatever to protect Egypt against the risk, which was then deemed imminent, of an invasion by the victorious Dervishes.

Such was the view popularly taken in Egypt of our action at the period of which I write. The view was not a just one, as the future was to prove ; but it was one which would not unreasonably be taken by a population irritated in its pride, injured in its interests, and endangered in its prospects by the policy our Government had pursued. At this ) time, too, the confidence of the Egyptian public in the duration of our military occupation had been