THE FALL OF KHARTOUM. 389 having to go to war with Russia, common sense dictated the abandonment, or, at any rate, the postponement, of a fresh Soudan campaign. It is of course possible that the Government may have had private information, which led them to believe a war between England and Russia to be really imminent.

But, looking back at the Pendjeh incident with the light of our subsequent experience, it seems to have belonged to the ordinary category of frontier disputes, which may furnish a pretext — but do not constitute a cause — for war, and which, as in this instance, can easily be settled if there is no desire for war on the part of either potential belligerent. The Pendjeh difficulty was terminated in the first days of May, by the reference of the matter in dispute to the King of Denmark ; and if our Government had been so minded, it would have been perfectly within their power to resume the preparations for an autumn campaign on the Nile. Various suggestions were made by British authorities in Egypt, civil as well as military, to induce the Government to modify their determination to leave the Soudan to its fate.

These suggestions, however, met with no response. A vigorous protest was made by Sir Evelyn Baring, who, in a despatch to the Foreign Office, used these words — "In view of the decision of the Government (to evacuate Dongola), instructions should be given to send down all troops and as many of the civil population as wished to leave to Wady Haifa. . . . Your lordship will understand that we