384 THE STORY OF THE KHEDIVATE.

will come to the conclusion that the rescue of Gordon had become hopeless, not hours or days, but weeks, before our advance guard got within sight of Khartoum. The city had lain at the mercy of the Dervishes for a very considerable period. The garrison were worn out, dispirited, and disloyal. Gordon had failed somehow to inspire them with the enthusiasm which his partisans declare he was wont to excite amidst races alien to his own in nationality, and creed, and civilization.

It seems well-nigh certain that the Mahdi could have captured Khartoum whejiever he thought fit to make the attack. The reason why he delayed the attack so long must necessarily be matter of conjecture. My one surmise, if I had to offer one, would be that, being aware, as he probably was, from his informants in Cairo, that the British expedition was sent with the sole object of rescuing Gordon, he thought it wiser not to precipitate the fall of Khartoum, so that in the event of their attack becoming formidable, he might save the situation by handing Gordon over to the advancing enemy.

Our victories at Abu Klea and Metemmeh, which proved the superiority of the British troops and of their armament to that of the Dervishes, upset the Mahdi's calculations. From that moment the fate of Gordon and of Khartoum was decided. To place the end and aim of the British expedition beyond the possibility of fulfilment, could, under the altered condition of affairs, be alone effected by the capture of Khartoum and the massacre of Gordon and his