THE FALL OF KHARTOUM. 37S 0. In a despatch of the same date to Sir Evelyn faring, he expressed his conviction that the retention f Khartoum was essential to the interests of both England and Egypt, as, if Khartoum was allowed 3 fall into the hands of the insurgents, the Mahdi ould forthwith invade Egypt, and that the task f defeating the invasion would prove far more rious than any campaign which might have to be )ught in the Soudan. Every allowance must be lade for a man left single-handed to perform an npossible task, and weighed down by an almost lorbid sense of responsibility. On the other hand, nybody who reads through the mass of contradictory nd extravagant messages which Gordon sent day fter day, as long as communication remained open, ill admit that considerable allowance should be lade for the British authorities if they failed to realize le gravity of the situation. On the i6th of March, rordon made an attempt to rescue the garrison at lalfiyeh, which failed, owing to the Egyptian troops tider his command, some 1500 strong, taking to ight the moment they were attacked by a few :ore of Dervishes. A week later, the Mahdi rejected le overtures made him by Gordon, and from that me it was obvious that Gordon's mission, in as far > its immediate objects were concerned, was an Dpeless failure.

I think it is obvious that by this time Gordon had >me to a similar conclusion. Except on this assump-Dn, I find it difficult to account for the resolution