THE EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN. 341 on Arabi and his associates, had been transferred to the Mahdi and his followers. A belief had gained ground in England that the Soudanese had been driven into rebellion by the oppression and venality of the Egyptian officials, who ruled the country ; while the Dervishes were represented by Englishmen, who ought to have known better, as patriots fighting for freedom and independence, and only anxious to be left alone to manage their own affairs.

I do not think the British Ministry of the day — little as I approve of their Egyptian policy — can fairly be blamed for their refusal to send British troops forthwith to the Soudan in order to retrieve the fortunes of the disastrous Hicks campaign. Where they are to blame, was for their inability, or rather their unwillingness, to realize the gravity of the situation. In Egypt, the probability of the Dervishes marching upon Cairo was probably exaggerated in the panic of the hour. But there can be no doubt that the idea of raiding the rich fertile lands of the Nile valley, of looting the wealthy cities of the Delta, of driving the Giaour out of the country, and of restoring the true faith of Islam, was seriously entertained by the victorious Dervishes, and was at a later period brought to the verge of execution. Never before or since, in Egypt, has there been so united and so vigorous an opposition to the advice tendered by the British authorities, as that which made itself manifest on the announcement that Egypt was bidden to evacuate the Soudan for once and for all. The