TEL-EL-KEBIR. 301 where he had a force of ii,ooo troops at his orders, and announced his intention of offering a determined resistance, and of burning down the city sooner than surrender it to the infidels. His plans, whatever they may have been, were upset by the promptitude with which General Wolseley followed up the victory of Telel-Kebir. Arabi had reckoned on some days elapsing i , before the British forces could reach Cairo. But the ' I British cavalry, by a forced march, arrived at the I Abassieh quarter of Cairo on the afternoon of the J. day following the battle. The garrison of 7000 men stationed at the Abassieh camp surrendered uncon-, ditionally at once. The garrison of the citadel, which was then, as now, an almost impregnable position, followed suit; and 4000 men laid down their arms. Arabi himself was the first to deprecate any further resistance, and thereby saved his neck from the fate \ he had so richly merited.

Such, told simply, is the story of the campaign, of which, in my opinion, a good deal more was made in England than its military importance deserved. It was the first time since the Crimean war that a British army had been engaged in a serious war outside its own possessions, and it was only reasonable that our national pride should have been gratified by the completeness and the brilliancy of our victory. There was a natural tendency, on the part of the British press, and to some extent of the British army, to enhance the credit of our success by exaggerating the gallantry of the enemjr-and the formidable character of the