THE ARABI MUTINY. 251 Khedive yielded to the demands of Europe. Starting from these premises, the conclusion was obvious that / the Dual Control had no real power behind it other / than the support of the Sultan. This delusion was J not shared by the reigning Khedive or his Ministers, but it took hold of the native population, especially in the towns. So long as Ismail remained on the throne, any serious insurrection was out of the question. The mere terror of his name sufficed for the preservation of order. Unfortunately, Ismail had left, as an ev\t\ legacy to the Egyptian army, the knowledge that the I civil Government was powerless as against organized military insubordination. The officers had learnt by the experience of the military demonstration, V which led to the overthrow of the Responsible / Ministry, that they were masters of the situation ; / and as soon as they ceased to have the fear ofl Ismail before their eyes, they proceeded to make \ use of their knowledge.

In the outset, the mutiny with which Arabi's name became connected was a purely military revolt, a sort 1 of Oriental pronunciamento. The army, or, at any / rate, its officers, had some reason to be discontented I with the era of economy and retrenchment initiated under the Dual Control. In Ismail's day the army consisted of 45,000 men. But the Porte took advantage of the firman investing Tewfik with the Khedivate, to reduce the number of troops which Egypt was allowed to keep under arms to 1 8,000 men in all. The measure was probably popular with the rank and. file, as the