I \ THE DEPOSITION OF ISMAIL PASHA. 215 failed, in all likelihood, in terrifying the Khedive into submission. But, under Prince Bismarck, Germany f had acquired the repute of never threatening unless ( she was prepared to strike. ) I have never yet seen any adequate explanation of the motives which induced Prince Bismarck to go out of his way to take part in an issue with which neither Germany nor her people had any close concern. ItJ may have been that, as the event proved, he was' fully aware the threat of German intervention would compel France and England to take action themselves ; he may have thought it well to break up the friendly \j relations which their common interests in Egyptian f affairs had brought about of late between these two! countries ; he may have been glad of an opportunityT to display the authority of Germany in International 1 matters, while incurring an infinitesimal risk of having / to vindicate that authority by action. I have often' thought myself that the idea of German intervention may have been suggested intentionally or unintentionally to Prince Bismarck by Nubar Pasha ; but, of any such suggestion having been made, I never could find any confirmation beyond its intrinsic probability.

The discovery that Germany was prepared to\ intervene created the utmost consternation in Paris ; J and both England and France agreed to join withf Germany in demanding the deposition of the Khedive by the Sultan. Up to the last, however, Ismail trusted blindly to the assurances transmitted to him froml Constantinople. Nor was this confidence unreasonable./