ilO I THE COUP D'ETAT. 211 and agreed that in view of recent events, they had no course open except to tender their resignations. Thus, up to the latter days of April, the Khedive seemed to be carrying all before him. Nubar had beeiT; dismissed ; the responsible Ministry had been sent to the right-about ; the Commission of Inquiry had been compelled to terminate its existence ; and no step towards active intervention had been taken either by England or by France. It is true the creditors, in | respect of unfunded debts, were still giving trouble ; \ but it seemed more than probable that if England and \ France had not been moved to action in Egypt by the summary dismissal of the Anglo-French Ministers, they would not resort to direct intervention in order I to uphold the authority of the International tribunaj What, perhaps, had even more effect in restoring \ Ismail's confidence in his own success, was the receipt j of private assurances . from Constantinople that the f Sultan was not disposed to support any request which might be addressed to him for the Viceroy s •deposition. I have been told, by one who ought toy know, that at this time his Highness received advice from one of the shrewdest of his French advisers, which, if it had been adopted, might have altered the course of events. The adviser in question was Barrot Pasha — a brother of M. Odillon Barrot — who had for many years filled the post of Foreign Secretary to the Khedive. Among all the Court circled at this period, there was a strong belief that Ismail f had laid by a very large sum of money out of the (