HOW TO GET THEBE. 71 CHAPTER XIX.

HOW TO GET THERE.

I have remarked that the Government by no means erred by any precipi¬ tate or hasty arrival at their determination to despatch a relieving force, or in blatantly announcing the same. This is very far within the truth. If they erred at all—and there are some, as we have seen, who thought so—it was in the opposite direction. The public were not informed, nor the enemy through the public, that a force would immediately take tine field ; that the conqueror of Tel-el-Kebir would assume command ; that Gordon would be reached, and rescued without delay ; that the Mahdi would be smashed ; and that the last spark of insurrection would be stamped under foot. Much as such a report might have cowed the rebels, the reverse of such a course was adopted. The intentions of the Ministry only leaked out by slow degrees ; even people at home found extreme difficulty in ascertaining their true policy ; the little phrase “ if necessary ” crept in, as a sort of saving clause, in all their utterances ; and the frequent changes of purpose served excellently to mystify all concerned and unconcerned. At first it was believed that the Suakim-Berber route was to be the one adopted. There were troops at the former place ; railway plant had been there deposited ; indeed some rails were already laid, and two engines were already on the spot. Then great stress began to be laid on the fact that Major Kitchener, a young officer of engineers, —a host in himself, certainly,—was at Debbeh, and he was described as the rocket line by which the cable was to be conveyed to the ship-wrecked vessel. Then people learned that the Nile between Assiout and Assouan was tlie “ scene of unwonted activity. ” Soon it was rumoured that the Admiralty had ordered 400 boats for the navigation of the river, and that a contingent of Canadian voyageurs had been telegraphed for, and that 3,000 troops were to be concentrated at Wady Haifa. Altogether, as the leading London paper editorially remarked, “the Government had kept the secret of their plans— for that they had a plan it would not be reasonable to doubt—without falter¬ ing, and they will be entitled hereafter to claim whatever credit may turn out to be due to the gift of silence as contributory to military success.”

We know now, however, what was in the minds of the authorities, and it is needless to pursue further the details of its working out. Suffice it to say, troops were to proceed to Khartoum, and Lord Wolseley was to take com¬ mand.