60 THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN.

certain that there was no cause to doubt his ultimate extrication from his present unfortunate position, it is doubtful if popular sympathy could ever have been fanned into so hot a flame, even were Khartoum doomed and the Mahdi finally triumphant.

Of all nations, perhaps the English is the most sentimental—in the true, deep, and better meaning of the word. The stolidity of the Germans prevents the free exercise of this feeling among those people ; amidst the frivolities of the French it is evanescent; in America more or less sordid influences stifle its growth.

Of this feeling Sir Michael Hicks-Beach took excellent advantage. In an energetic and closely-reasoned speech he reviewed the histo y of the mission, and recalled the feeling of gratification which the country experienced on learning that Gordon was to be untrammelled. He showed how, never¬ theless, the Government had thwarted their envoy, had intimated that no assistance would be sent him, and lastly had invited him to retire as best he could. With much effect he flung at the Treasury benches, with a marked 3tress on the personal pronoun, the sentence from Gordon’s despatch—‘ ‘ I shall leave to you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons.” * To this speech Mr. Gladstone replied with all the exuberance of debating power and aggressive energy of invective of which he was capable. He had for ten days previously refused to give any detailed statement regarding General Gordon’s mission, and the means to be adopted for his relief, on the ground that it was proper to wait for the debate on the vote of censure. This debate had now come. But, according to the Times, “ it is hardly too much to say that the emptiness and irrelevance of his speech filled the most faithful of his followers with consternation. . . . The impression produced in the House of Commons was one of deep disappointment, and that feeling, we believe, will be still stronger out of doors.” This—whether or not it be a correct estimate of Mr. Gladstone’s defence, resulted in, if not a theoretical, yet a practical, defeat of the Government. The motion certainly was negatived * The despatch reads thus : “ (Telegraphic.) Khartoum, April 16, 1884, 5.15 p.m.

“Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring.

“ As far as I can understand, the situation is this : you state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr.

“I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. “ I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the equator, and leave to you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great diffi¬ culties if you would retain peace in Egypt.”