48 THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN.

CHAPTER XII.

STILL FURTHER REVERSES.

After Gordon’s arrival at Khartoum, while he was exerting his utmost en¬ deavours to avert warfare and bring about a peaceful solution of all difficulties, affairs elsewhere wore a threatening aspect. On February the 21st, Tokar sur¬ rendered to the rebels. This in itself was a loss of the first magnitude, for, in addition to its important position, being on the littoral and within a short distance of Suakim—a port of inestimable value, the effect upon the rebels was much to be dreaded. The way in which it was given up also added to its ill effects. There was no valid reason for its surrender : there was an abun¬ dance of provisions ; the garrison truly numbered only 300, but there were 45,000 rounds of ammunition, and the authorities were perfectly aware of the fact that British forces were hastening to their rescue.

Bad news came also from Massowah further down (south) the coast.

And it was said that the insurrection was spreading everywhere even amongst the Government officials. Suakim also was reported to be in a disorganized condition. One thing saved Tokar’s garrison from the sad fate of that of Sinkat, viz. : the presence of an English regiment at Trinkitat. Sinkat was helpless, and no terms would the rebels make. Tokar was within reasonable distance of aid, and the life of its garrison was spared. “ Possibly too,” says the Cairo correspondent of the London Times, “ because the prestige of General Gordon had reached the eastern tribes.” On this subject this writer waxes warm. “Mr. Gladstone,” he says, “despises prestige. So do many less able men despise prestige—as well as sugar-plums and children’s toys. But if by one or the other we can save valuable lives and restore peace, why not employ them ? The other day the adhesion of some powerful Sheikhs was gained at Suakim by presenting them with some squeaking dolls. Because such gifts would not influence the Premier, there is no reason why we should not employ them with savages. And it is the same with prestige. What else but prestige enabled General Gordon to cross the desert and create peace as if with a magic wand ? It may be foolish to fight solely for prestige, but, having it, it is more foolish to refuse to use it in order to obtain valuable ends. Had the policy accepted a week ago been adopted a fortnight earlier, it would have saved Sinkat. A month earlier it would have saved Morice Bey and his companions; six months earlier it would have saved Hicks Pasha, Colonel Moncrieff, and 10,000 Egyptians. If it had been adop-