18 THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN..

Thus, in reality, in an engagement lasting some twenty-five minutes was the rebellion crushed ; the loss of life on our side being as small as the battle

was short—amounting, in all, to 54 killed and 342 wounded. **********

Events after this are comparatively uninteresting. With the fall of Cairo and the capture of Arabi the “national” movement, as it was called, com¬ pletely collapsed. The re-embarkation of the British troops at once com¬ menced. Arabi Pashi was tried and condemned, although he put into the hands of his counsel documents which implicated the Sultan, Ismail, the ex-Khedive, and numerous Egyptian officials. Lord Dufferin was sent to suggest reforms, and the last day of 1882 saw the first instalment of his much- praised scheme for the regeneration of Egypt.

Ex-Ivhedive Ismail Pasha sums up Arabi’s character thus : “ I remember Arabi well. He became a Lieutenant-Colonel when very young', and, in the second or third year of my Administration, was tried by Court-martial for breach of trust. He should have been broken, but one of my Generals persuaded me to pardon him, and I did so. He was then transferred to the Commissariat, and only quite recently returned to active service in the army. Arabi can be painted in a word— he is what the French call a ‘ blageur. ’ He can talk and do nothing else. He is the tool of Mahmoud Fehmy and Toulba, about both of whom I have nothing good to say. Arabi is, and always was, an arrant coward. I always said he would run away, and he certainly decamped very quickly at Tel-el-Kebir, The only brave men in his party are Ali Fehmy and Adelal; they are soldiers, but I would defy Arabi himself to define either ‘patriotism’ or ‘national feeling.’ He certainly has neither one nor the other, although half Europe seems inclined to regard him as the would-be saviour of his coun¬ try. The truth is that the Egyptian people must lean on something and follow some one. The Egyptian Government was hopelessly weak, and Arabi and his friends knew it. He and his partisans achieved three visible and striking successes, and the Egyptians saw this, and saw, morever, the representatives of great Powers practically in treaty with him. Arabi pointed triumphantly to these facts, and told the Egyptians he could and would restore Egypt to the Egyptians; and it is not surprising in the circumstances that the Egyptians clung to him as the stronger vessel. The movement he headed was from the first actively encouraged at Constantinople, but it is very improbable that either the Sultan himself or any of his responsible Ministers were ever in direct com¬ munication either with him or his associates. Direct communication is not a feature of Turkish intrigue, as the desired effect can be produced without it. Arabi and his accomplices must be severely punished. An example should certainly be made of the leaders of the revolt, and half-measures will only be a premium to future disturb¬ ances. They may give to Egypt a succession of Arabis. Arabi himself should be treated as a vulgar mutineer and rebellious soldier; to look on him as an Egyptian Garibaldi is a capital mistake, and one which augurs ill for the future. ”