JO EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

enough, gave rise to some suspicions. Whether this had any effect on our ministry or on the Egyptian ministry is a question, but the fact remains, that even though Sir E. Baring at last became converted to Gordon's opinions, and earnestly represented that the despatch of Zebehr to Khartum would be the best, if not the only solution of the increasing difficulty, and the means of averting impending danger, Zebehr was not sent, and the government continued to refuse to reinstate him.

The object of General Gordon in seeking an interview with Zebehr Pasha before official witnesses was to discover what were the probabilities against securing the co-operation of the exchieftain in restoring a regular government to the Soudan. The result was not very promising, and we shall see that though Gordon tentatively sent proposals to Zebehr to make him subgovernor, the offer was not accepted. At a council held immediately after the interview, and consisting of Sir E. Baring, Nubar Pasha, Sir Evelyn Wood, Colonel Stewart, and General Gordon; Lieutenant-colonel Watson of the Egyptian army was asked what he thought of sending Zebehr and Gordon together to the Soudan. He answered, that not himself alone but natives thoroughly acquainted with both men were of opinion that such a policy would entail the death of one or other of them. This being the case, and with the recollection of what Gordon had indignantly said of Zebehr when it was proposed to send him back to the Soudan in 1879; remembering, too, that one of the first precautions suggested by Gordon when he undertook the mission to Khartum was that Zebehr should be under careful surveillance; and perhaps, above all, recalling Gordon's memorandum in reply to a proposition of Cherif Pasha to employ Zebehr at Suakim, it is not to be wondered at that Sir E. Barine and others in authority at Cairo could not participate in the opinion that the former chief of the slave-trade could with safety be placed in a position which would give him an opportunity for attaining almost absolute power, and would enable him to defy the Egyptian government, if he chose to repudiate obligations which there would be no adequate authority to enforce. It is true that Sir E.