GENERAL GORDON S MEMORANDUM. 5 I forces is, that the bulk of those v, ho were with him at Obcid will refuse to cross the Nile, and that those who do so will not exceed 3000 or 4000 men, and also that these will be composed principally of black troops who have deserted, and who, if offered fair terms, would come over to the government side. In such a case, viz.

' Sultans accepting transfer of territory and refusing the supremacy of the Mahdi, and Mahdi's black troops coming over to the Qfovernment,' — resulting weakness of the Mahdi. What should be done should the Mahdi's adherents attack the evacuating columns?

It cannot be supposed that these are to offer no resistance, and it in resisting they should obtain a success, it would be but reasonable to allow them to follow up the Mahdi to such a position as would ensure their future safe march. This is one of those difficult questions which our government can hardly be expected to answer, but which may arise, and to which I would call attention. Paragraph 1 fixes irrevocably the decision of the government, viz. to evacuate the territory, and, of course, as far as possible, involves the avoidance of any fighting. I can, therefore, only say that, having in view paragraph i, and seeing the difficulty of asking her Majesty's government to give a decision or direction as to what should be done in certain cases, that I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible according to their wish to the best of my ability, and with avoidance, as far as possible, of all fighting. I would, however, hope that her Majesty's government will give me their support and consideration should I be unable to fulfil all their expectations.

" 5. Though it is out of my province to give any opinion as to the action of her Majesty's government in leaving the Soudan, still I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer these peoples and then hand them back to the Egyptians without guarantees of future crood government. It is evident that this we cannot secure them without an inordinate expenditure of men and money. 1 he Soudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be so. Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren, it cannot be governed except by a dictator, who may be eood or bad. If bad, he will cause constant revolts. No one who