Facsimile · p. 67
A TELEGRAM FROM KHARTUM. 47 negroes. In three days this town may be in the hands of the rebels, yet there has been an attempt made to prevent the Kawah and Duem garrisons from joining us. . . . On Christmas Day Ibrahim Pasha told me that every house in Khartum had arms in it, and we are not strong enough to have domiciliary visits carried out. Colonel Coetlogon is indefatigable in his efforts to provide that nothing should be left undone for the safety of the town. All the works have been carried out under his personal supervision, and he is continually inspecting the working gangs while at work; he has driven a deep ditch and parapet 1400 metres long across the level space or plain left dry by the subsidence of the river; but for him this broad avenue into the town would have been left open and unprotected, so now the fortification runs from river to river. There is here a small portion of the population, European or otherwise, whose loyalty is undoubted. These men would undoubtedly be ready to defend their property and families here, and act as police to keep the mob in check, in case of attack, but there are no arms to serve out to them, there being but a few hundred rifles in the arsenal, not enough to provide for accidents amongst the soldiers."
Now, on the 1st of December Earl Granville had telegraphed to Sir E. Baring asking whether, if General Gordon were willing1 to go to Egypt, he would be of any use either to the consul-general or to the Egyptian government, and if so, in what capacity; and the reply received the next clay had been: — "The Egyptian government is very much averse to employing General Gordon, mainly on the ground that the movement in the Soudan being religious, the appointment of a Christian in high command would probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful. I think it wise to leave the whole responsibility of Soudan affairs to them, and not to press them on the subject."
On the 9th of January Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed to the khedive strongly urging an immediate withdrawal from Khartum.
One-third of the garrison were unreliable, and if it had been twice as strong it could not have held Khartum against the whole country, which, without a doubt, was all opposed to