IO EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

permanent and exterior aid to the khedive in dealing with revolted provinces. But conditions changed with such rapidity that the very position we had been obliged to assume in relation to the

organization of a better government for the prevention of future rebellion, seemed to necessitate the abandonment of the policy which had been announced, namely, limited and temporary pro-

tection both of loyal Egyptians and of foreigners. We had remained to settle the consequences of our interposition in an internal rebellion, and now were face to face with an insurrection not only in the distant western provinces, but in the eastern district, where the seaboard from Massowa to Suakim, and inland as far as the White Nile, was threatened.

Neither the pressure of events, made almost irretrievable by the delays and incapacity of the Egyptian government to deal with them, nor the persistent and repeated censure of the

opposition, nor the change of opinion which was to be observed

in the country, drove Mr. Gladstone's ministry to what their opponents called prompt, but which they would have designated rash action. They were determined to do nothing which would amount to an armed intervention necessitating the continued occupation of the country, and they would not recede from their

refusal to interpose for the purpose of enabling Egypt to retain

Khartum and the western provinces. At the same time they had prepared to take another step which, as was afterwards proved,

indefinitely increased their responsibility, and gave a new argument

to the few opponents who declared that we ought never to have meddled with Egyptian affairs at all nor fired a shot at Alexandria.

It was determined that though we could not consistently aid in the retention of Khartum and the other strongholds of the

Soudan provinces by the Egyptian government, we might, in accordance with advice which had been so peremptory as to put

an end to a ministry, assist in the evacuation of these places and

the establishment in them of a native government of some kind.

It is not surprising that, directly this solution of the difficulty appeared possible, the thoughts of the responsible ministers should turn to General Gordon, whose remarkable successes in China and