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GORDON AND THE MAHDI 56 shore and of the Eastern Soudan. The British Government,while notifyingits partial acquiescenceinthe latter suggestion, expressed the conviction that Egypt, of itself, was unable to cope with the insurrection, and recommended the withdrawalof the whole of the Soudan garrisons at anearly date. This injunction, equivalentto a command, caused the greatestexcitementinCairo, and rather than be the instrumentof carryingit out,Cherif Pasharesignedhis post, and Nubar Pasha was appointed to succeed him.
party, and we are not strong enough to seizethem and openlyhang them. The other night the Governormade the cool proposition to poison them, but as Colonel de Coetlogon wouldnot listen to this, he suggested that as their servants were in his pay they could be secretly strangled in bed." On New Year's day, "Colonel de Coetlogonhad a telegram fromtheKhedive to saythathe believes he cannotget a column together to release us, so wemust dependon the neighbouringsheikhs to assist us. This is reallyrich, as the Khediveknows very wellthat there is not a sheikh in the Soudan who would or dare helpus. Toshow how much the Khedive knows of the place,he telegraphs to ask 'Arethe gates closed.'
as if the place had walls, whereas it is an open town with gardens, fields, &c, and had no defence round it till Colonel de Coetlogonhad the ditch cut."
When the order was given fcr the evacuationof the Soudan there were ten fortified places occupied by Egyptian troops. Of these El Fashar, the capital of Darfour,in the extreme west, waspractically out of consideration,as the wholedistrictbetweenit andKhartoum was in rebellion. Gondokoro, too, was too far to the south to affect the situation. Of the rest, Kassala and Amadel, andFashodaandSenaarcommandedrespectively the upper course of the White Nile and the prosperous country lyingbetween the twoNiles. But the most important positions were Berber,Dongola, and Khartoum, and thebeleaguered garrisonsat Sinkat and Tokar.
The Egyptian Ministry of War drew up a statement on the subject of the evacuation, setting forth thatthere were 21,000 Egyptian troops and 84 guns in the Soudanprovinces between Dongola andGondokoro; that the removal of the supplies of ammunitionstored at Kassala to Khartoum would require 4,000 camels, or 6,000 if the suppliesof war material on the Abyssinian frontier were also to be withdrawn. The report went on to state that amarchfromBerberto Wady Haifa through the desert was a physical impossibility, and that the homeward journey would therefore have to be madeby river. Such a journey would occupy three months, and would require 1,300 boats. At a meeting of traders interestedin the Soudan,heldat Alexandria about this time,it was statedthatthere were15,000 Christians and 40,000 Egyptians in the various provinces; that there were noless than 1,000 commercial houses owned by-Europeans, and3,000by Egyptians, and that theimport and export trade was of the value of £13,000,000 annually. It was further statedthat the Soudan could not be evacuated in less than seven months, and then only at an expenditureof a million sterling The cry of the beleaguered garrisons had reached England, where general sympathy was felt for their forlorn condition,and SirEvelyn Baring having warned the Governmentthat it would be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full power to withdraw all the garrisons from the Soudan andto makethe bestarrangementspossiblefor thefuture governmentof that country,it became indispensable for some action to be taken. General Gordon chanced to arriveinEnglandat thisopportunemoment,havino* been summonedby the King of the Belgians from his retirement in Palestine to take charge of the extensive district at the mouthof the Congo, thathad been brought under the controlof the International Association. EarlGranville indirectly learned that Gordon had expressed his willingness to goto the Soudan if his services were needed,and communicatedthis intelligence to Sir Evelvn Baring, who telegraphedin reply that there could be no better man. Just as Gordon was on the point of leavinforBrussels to receive his final instructions respecting the Congo business, a telegram reached him at South ampton from Lorf Wolseley,saying, "Come up at once." Tim telegram,' observed Gordon, in a letter written "At Sea 22, 1, 84," to his friend the Rev. Reginald Barnes, came when Iwas so bothered that Isaid to As-regards the garrisonsin Senaar, there wasno possibility of relievingthem,owingto the enemyhavingbarred the Nile withheavily laden boats and thus rendered it impassable. A couple of steamers weresent from Khartoum to destroy this bridge of boats,but after a sharp encounter with a large body of rebels, returned without having accomplished their purpose. The forces onthe BahrGhazul were also cut off. Gondokoro was however said to be still holding out, while according to a letter from Slaten Bey, Governor-Generalof Darfour, bearing date ElFashar, December4, the state of thingsin that provincewas most critical, owingto the want of money and ammunition. The rebels were surrounding El Fashar in large numbers, and there had been some desertions from the Egyptiantroops,but several drumhead courts-martial on the offenders had had a good effect in maintaining strict discipline. The FalseProphet's forces had attackedUmshanga, sixty miles from El Fashar, and the garrison had surrendered without offeringany resistance.
CHAPTER IX.
Political consequences of the destruction of Hicks Pasha's army.— Withdrawal of the Soudan garrisons determined on.— General Gordon selected to effect thisobject.— His acoount of the arrangement.— His official instructions.— HearrivesatCairo accompanied by Colonel Stewart— Receiveshis appointment from theKhedive. — He starts for Khartoum.— Journey across theNubian desert.— ArrivesatBerber.— Supplantsthe Vice-Governor ofthe Soudan.— ■ Proclamation to the inhabitants of Khartoum.— His reception at Khartoum.— Effectsimmediateadministrativereforms.— Abolishes the Kourbash, remits arrears of taxes and empties the prison.— He embarks a portion of the garrison.— Telegraphs for Zebebr Pasha to be appointed to succeedhim.— Objections on thepart of the British Government.— Failure of conciliating mission to th*e tribes of the White Nile.— Gordon's first brush withthe rebels ■— Rescue of the Halfaya garrison.— Defeat of Gordon's troops at Halfaya.— Two treacherous pashas executed.— Gordon offers the Sultanship ofWest Darfour to the Mahdi.— The Mahdi declines. and asks Gordon tobecome a Mussulman.— The tribes summoned againstKhartoum.— Pettyengagementswith the rebels.— Gordon's estimate of his assailants.— Khartouminvested. The politicalconsequences of the destructionof Hicks Pasha's army, followed as this was by minor defeatsof Egyptian troops in the neighbourhoodofSuakim, were soon apparent at Cairo, and Sir Evelyn Baring, our representative there,reported to the British Government thatit was impossiblefor theEgyptianauthorities, with the forces at their disposal, to hold the Soudan,and suggestingthat it wouldbenecessary,after withdrawing the various garrisons, to fall back from Khartoum on to Egypt proper. Cherif Pasha, the Khedive's primeminister, wished to hold theNile uptoKhartoum with the viewof securing the safety of Egypt, but was willing to restore to Turkey the administration of the Red Sea