2 3 EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

hardly detect them from a stone. When they wished to make a sign to each otlier they imitated the cry of the desert birds with marvellous fidelity, and often has this low plaintive cry been the signal for their onslaught. Sometimes it was a volley followed by a rush with swords and spears, but more often a dark figure would seem to rise out of the very ground at the sentry's feet and stab him in the back ; or if it was impossible to get sufficiently near to him unperceived they would wait till he moved away on his beat, knowing well his exact position by the crunching of his heavy ammunition boots on the gravel, and wriggling past like serpents slip among the tents ; then would follow the death scream, the rush of feet, and fierce volleys poured in rapid succession into the night after a few shadowy forms disappearing in the darkness, content at having achieved their work of murder and mutilation. This would be the signal for a general alarm along the whole line; the Arabs further out in the desert would open fire with their Remingtons, bullets would come whizzing into the camp in all directions, and the force be kept on the alert until the long hours of the night passed away and the sun rose on another day of incessant work at the wharves and trenches for men who had enjoyed no sleep."

After the arrival of General Graham on the I2th March many changes were made on the position and relative situation of the camps, by which the danger caused by these night attacks was much diminished ; and still later, defences were constructed at certain points, including stockades or seribas of the thorny mimosa, rope and wire entanglements, and trenches formed for shelter.

On the 1 6th March the laying of the railway was commenced, and the camp was entirely remodelled. Sir Gerald Graham's despatch from headquarters to Lord Hartington said that spies had reported Tamai to be held by about 7000 men, and that a force of looo to 1 200 was at Hasheen, while Tokar was held by a small force, and Handoub probably by a weak detachment. The 20th Hussars had disembarked that day. The artillerj-, the mounted infantry, and the Australian contingent had not arrived, and the horse- artillery battery was incomplete. As soon as the force was complete and the water transport and field storage arrangements were fully organized he intended to move at once. There was great difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of water-tanks and tins; but on Major De Cosson being asked if he would undertake to put 13,000 gallons of water into the field at daybreak on the 20th he said he would, and the task was completed though sufficient men could not be spared—or zvcre not spared—to assist in the work, and the officers and some Egyptian soldiers lent for the purpose by Colonel Chermside, the governor-general of the Red Sea littoral, were not particularly effective.

Though at this date the professed plan of campaign was promptly to