THE FIGHTING LN THE MATOPPO HILLS.

743 She saidthat there were five impis assembledin the neighbouring hills,but that the men were disheartened by their repeated defeats, and manyof them would like to give in, but the chiefs would not let them. They had plenty of food and ammunition, but they were anxious about the next year's crop being left unsown, and they hadexpectedthat (as their wizards told them) the whitemen woulddie as the cattlehad died of the rinderpest; instead of which, the whites seemed more numerous than ever, and were workingtheir wayinto what the Matabele liad regarded as the impregnable fastnesses of theMatoppos.

among the bush andjungle of the lower valley ; these peaks and the fingers themselves formed the strongholds of the individual impis. It was evident that if we could get our gunsinto the commanding position afforded by the knuckles they would be able to bring an effective fire to bear on each of the strongholds in turn, and thus prepare the way for our storming them from the valley. Colonel Plumer ordered the guns, with a strong escort of 130 men, under Captain the Hon. J. Beresford, 7th Hussars, to endeavour to gain a position on the ridge, moving up that shoulder of it which might be termed the thumb. With BeresfordIsent two of my'boys' as guides and scouts, and Itold Beresfordto keep a good look-outingoing out, as he might find Inyanda's impi on the right of his path, while theremaining four were away to his left. At 7.30 this party movedaway to our right front. The main body meanwhile wereto remain concealed where they were until the guns got into position for shelling the strongholds, upon which it would move forward and attack them in succession."

Next day, August 5th, ColonelPlumer fought the decisive action which practically ended the campaign of the Matoppo Hills. The enemy were the five Matabele impis, afterwards estimated at a total of 3,000 fighting men, commanded by some of their best chiefs, Inyanda, Sekombo,and three others. The attackingforce was nearly 800 strong,being made up of 89 of the Matabeleland Mounted Police, and 350 of Plumer's own corps, the Matabeleland Relief Force, 57 officers and menof the R.A. detachment,158 of Colembrander's native corps, and 100 ofRobertson's CapeBoys. There were four machine guns, two mountainguns, and a rocket tube. A small detachment with two Maxims and a mountain gun had been left to guard the camp, to whichthe attacking force was to return in the evening after the fight, so that packs, great-coats,and allother impedimenta could be left behindunder this guard.

Beresford's party, advancing slowly oververy difficult ground covered with bush, did not reach the foot of the hills till 8.15. Here the guides declared they did not know the way,and the officers reconnoitredin front while the party halted. Apath was selected, and theascpnt ot the hill began. A small plateau or shoulder half-way up had just beenreached,and the party had halted to rest and close up, when it was rushed on three sides, in front and on both flanks, by masses of the enemy. The front attack showed in the bush only 130 yards off; oneof the flank attacks openedfire at a range of only fifty yards amonga mass of boulders. The mountain guns opened with case, the Maxim was brought into action, but the other machine gun was droppedby the nativeporters, whoran away into the bush. When it was picked up, part of its gear could not be found, and it was useless. For more than an hour Beresford's partyhad to fight for their lives, losing heavily. The firing washeard by the main body, but the sound seemed to bemoving away, and Plumer and his officers imagined that the detachment was driving the enemy before it as it marched up the hills. The bush concealed all viewof the action.

"The column paraded in the darkat half-past four in the morning," writes Colonel Baden-Powell (whoduring the campaign did the double duty of chief of the staff and warcorrespondent to a London paper). "It moved off silently, at lighting fires or pipes, as we were close under the heightsoccupied bythe enemy's lookouts. It fell to me to act as guide, sinceIknew something of the country to be traversed and the point where the enemy were posted. It meant passing through two outer ranges of hills and through a wooded pass into a semicircular valley or amphitheatre, two sides of which were occupied by the rebel impis. At sunrise we arrived in the camp leading into this valley, where we were completely sheltered from view by the bush. The back of the valley was formed by a single high ridge of smooth granite, and from it five offshoots ran downinto the valley like fingers from theridge of knuckles. At the tip of each of these fingers rose rocky peaks At 10 o'clock the enemy had been beaten off, but still held the rocky and bush-covered hillside 300 yards in front. Beresford sent Plumer a report to the effect that he had beaten off the