THE MATABELE WARS. 728 government, the appeal to Jameson was to be published, and he was to marchon the city and join his forces with thoseof thecommitteebefore the Boers could take any* effective action. It wasexpectedthat theBritishGovernment would then be forced to intervene on the side of the Uitlander leaders. It was not expected that there would be any seriousfighting. The Boers wouldbe surprised,but even if they did resist, the Company's Maxims would be as effective against them as they had been in easily won battles against theMatabele. Bothat Johannesburg and on the border severalBritish officers of rank hadplaced their servicesat the disposal of the conspiracy.

President Kruger and the Boer Government It was at or near Krugersdorp that Jameson expected to join hands with the Johannesburg Uitlanders. If the raid was to be asuccess the 170 miles wouldhave to becovered before the Boers couldmusterinforce. From the veryoutset the leadersof the expedition carried it out in a most incompetent fashion. The wire connecting Mafeking with the Cape was cut, the only possible object of this being tokeep theImperial authorities in ignoranceof what washappening. But nothing was done to prevent the news travelling to Pretoria. The wire on that side was not cut. Nothing was done to prevent a warningbeing sent by the Boer commandant at Marico on the border, who protested against, but hadno force to oppose, the inroad. On the knew something of their preparations. Speaking to a Boer deputation,Kruger had grimly remarked that if one wants tokill a tortoise one must wait till he puts his head outside his shell. The committee at Johannesburg had called a great meeting of the Uitlanders forJanuary6th, 1896, and it was during this meeting thatJameson, with his troopers and his Maxims, was to have reached the city. But the leaders,bothon theborder and atJohannesburg,were growinguneasy. Theysuspected that if they waited till the 6th the Boers Tuesday morning when Eloff, Kruger's grandson, rode up to the column and tried to persuade the leaders to abandon the enterprise,he wa» merely disarmedandreleased after a short detention, and doubtless carried to the Boer lines full particulars of the advancing force. The march was so badly arranged that the men andhorses hadhardiy any time for rest and food, and the relays of fresh horses on the road were found to be mostly halfbroken animals that could not be used.

The British High Com-DR. JAMESON.

might anticipate them, and they precipitated the movement. In Christmas week the committee armed their followers and took possession of Johannesburg, and Jameson crossed the border near Pitsani on the night of Sunday,December 29th, with 530 troops, three guns and eight Maxims. In the afternoon he had asked the men to volunteer to go to Johannesburg to protect life and property. The officers had not actually said, but had allowed their men to suppose, that the march was undertaken with at least the tacit consent of the Imperial authorities.

About seventeen miles west of the " gold-reef city" lies Krugersdorp, connected by railway with Johannesburg ; andit wason Krugersdorp the raid was directed in the first instance, the distanre tobe coveredbeing just over 170 miles.

missioner at the Cape, Sir H. Robinson, nosooner heard of the raid than he disavowed it, warned all faithful subjects of the Queen.

to have nothing to do with it,and despatched mounted messengers from the border to overtake the column and order Dr. Jameson to retire,and personally warn the officers withhim to withdraw. These orders weredisregarded. Meanwhile Johannesburg wasin the hands of the committee and its armed levies, but disavowedby theHighCommissioner theyhesitated. and began tonegotiate with the Boer Government. Apparently when they sent their delegates to interview Mr. Kruger and theBritish agent at Pretoria, they were very vaj informed as to Jameson's movements. They were the most half-hearted ofrevolutionists. At Pretoria they promised the British agent that