THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR. 684 and the hills,and, as soon asit came in contact with the Greeks, was to open fire in order to make themshow what positions they held and in what force. The left column under Nairn Pasha, composed of the rest of the troops (six squadrons, six battalions, and a field battery), was to march by the main roadthroughRizomylon. At three p.m. Mahmud's advanced cavalry reported the enemy in position on the hills near Velestino. Half an hour later he brought his guns into action and deployed a battalion in front as a firing line. The Greeks replied with rifle fire from shelter trenches on the hills and from the edge of a little wood,and There was no telegraph between Gherli and the headquarters at Larissa. Edhem Pasha therefore sent oneof his staff, Colonel Mahmud Bey, toGherli on the morning of the 29th, to consult withNairn and Suleiman as to the next step to be taken. Mahmud had only reached Larissa from Constantinople the evening before. He was the son of Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, who had commanded against the Russians in Asia in the war of 1877-78. Althoughonly thirty years of age,he was a colonel of cavalry and an aidede-camp to the Sultan,andhad served for some years as an officer of the Guards in the German army. It washis first experienceof active war-GREEK IRREGULARS, fare, and there is no doubt that, like others of the younger officers who were trained in European methods, he was chafing at Edhem's slowness.

theirmountain guns openedfrom a hillnearthe railway station. The firing continued hotly for about half an hour. Mahmud judged that the force opposed to him was about four battalions with six mountain guns and no cavalry. This estimategave tlae Turks a decidedsuperiority in numbers; so leaving the column in charge of Suleiman, Mahmud galloped off to Rizomylon village to propose to Nairn an immediate combined attack by both columns.

He reached Gherli at one o'clock and talked over the situation with Nairn and Suleiman. The result of this council of war was that it was resolved to make another attack on the Velestino position, Mahmud arguing that the only result ofdelay would be that tlaeGreeks would have more time to entrench themselves and to receivereinforcements. Thoughinferior in rank to his two colleagues, he practically took the direction of tlae movement.

But Nairn washopelessly behindhand. It was not tillhalf-past five that his infantry began to cross the bridge of Rizomylon, and when Mahmud met himit was decided that it was too late in the day to begin the battle. Mahmud was anxious to attempt a night attack on the Greek trenches,but Nairn would not co-operate, and it was finally settled that the troops should bivouac along the Rizomylon brook and on the TheTurkish force was formed in twocolumns. The right column, led by Mahmud and Suleiman, composed of seven squadrons of cavalry, twobattalions ofinfantry, and the horsebattery, was to move by tlae road between the railway