THE CHINO-JAPANESE'WAR, 1894—95. 586 ridge wouldbeuntenable,andthesebeing taken, the rest must fall in succession, and the place wouldbe at themercy of the besiegers.

The main road ran into the town of Port Arthur through a gapbetweentheI-tzuplateau and the inland extremity of the northern ridge, crossing an open level space used as a parade ground by the garrison. The I-tzu forts commanded the gap from the left, and on the right its approaches were covered by the guns of a strong fort built on the summitof Sungshu-shan (the Pine Tree Hill), the western buttress of the ridge. Next,running along the crest of the sickle-shaped curve of the ridge, stood seven forts on the long summits known as the Erh-lung (the Two Dragons;in some Japanese narratives the Urlung) and the Chihuan (the Cock's Comb). Another fort looked out on the sea from the east end of the ridge, and between it and the isolated hill near the town there was another fort on the lower ground, also forming part of the seaward been said at the outset of the war about the " armed millions" of China, it is curious that she could only find this handful of men for the defence of the fortress that was her chief naval base; while the navy itself could lend no co-operation whateverto the landforces.

On November 20th,just before the abortive sortie of the Chinese, Marshal Oyama had assembled his principal officers at his headquarters— not for a council of war, but to explain to them the arrangementshe proposed to make for the assault of the forts next day. The troops were to form up at 2 a.m.ready to march from their camps between Shuang-taikow and Tu-cheng-tzu,so as to be in position before Port Arthur by dawn. They were to march in three columns :on the right General Yamaji, with main body consisting of the bulk of the first division; in the centre General Hasegawa'sbrigade;on the left a smallcolumn of all three arms, moving between Hasegawa's troops and the sea, and guarding the flank of the advance against a possible sortie from the forts on the north ridge. At dawn the fleet would open fire on the forts nearest the sea. The artillery of the first division on the right would come into action against the fortson the I-tzu plateau,taking up its position on a ridge facing thenorth side of the plateau, and distant about a mile from the forts. In this position the guns could also be brought to bear on the gap leading to the town. On the lest of the field artillery, and a littleto its rear, tlae heavy guns of the siege train wereto come into action near the village of Shui-shih-ying (" the Naval Camp "), firing first at the I-tzuplateau andthe Pine TreeHillFort (Sung-shu-shan), and inthe second stage of the fight devoting all their attention to the western forts on the ridge. Hasegawa was to occupy the high groundnorth of Shui-shih-ying, facing the ridge forts on which he was to open fire.

During this bombardment General Nishi, with the first brigade of Yamaji's division,was to work round to the left,or south-western flank of the I-tzu plateau. For the greater part of the wayhis march wouldbe concealed fromthe Chinese by alower range of hills running north and south. In fact, he would be under cover until his troops moved over the crest of the range opposite their objective and deployed lor the attack. All this timehis movementswould defences. The hill between the town and the sea, Huang-chin-shan (the Golden Hill), was crowned by a fort armed with nineteen guns. Seven forts were built on the promontory betweenthe harbour and tlae sea known to the Chinese as Lan-hu-wei— i.e. the Tiger's Tail. Thelargest andhighest placed of these,built on Man-tou-shan (Bread Hill), was constructed to fire across the harbour and cover the left flank of theI-tzuplateauwith itslong-rangingguns.

The forts had all been planned, constructed, and armed under the superintendence of European and American engineers. Their heavy armament consisted of breech-loading Armstrongs and Krupps. There were a few quick-firers, field-pieces, andmountainguns, and some machine-guns were used to flank tlae ditches. The garrison consisted of about 10,000 men. Japanese writers,anxious not tominimise the success of their own.army, assert that this was an adequate garrison; but, even if the troops and their officers had been of better quality, 10,000 men would be dangerously dispersed and terribly overworked in a prolongeddefence of a fortress which wasprotected not only by a system of sea forts,but also by a line of land works extending over about seven miles of ground. There were twenty-two forts in all. Allowing only an average of 400 men for the defence of each of them, there would be a reserve of only 1,200 men left. Thirty thousand men for the fortifications would not have been toomany. Considering all that had not in any way mask the fire of the Japanese batteries. It was expected that by the time Nishi wasready to advance, tlae guns of theI-tzu